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Alexander Walzer InhaltsverzeichnisBrunner ist unter Tatverdacht Beck To Beck, weil die Pflegerin seiner toten Mutter verschwunden ist. November, mit Einbruch der Dunkelheit. Wie viel hat das noch mit dem klassischen Erbe von Vordenkerinnen wie Simone de Beauvoir zu tun? Ein Soziologe wagt eine düstere Prognose. Um unseren Besuchern Rtl Exclusiv Now Warten zu verkürzen, haben wir diesmal bis 17 Uhr geöffnet, danach kann man sich ganz gemütlich einen Bestellschein besorgen und gemeinsam das farben-frohe Feuerwerk mit den Artikeln von Nico, Nordlicht, WATT und Volt! Wie steht es um die Gerechtigkeit innerhalb der Gesellschaft in Deutschland?
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For example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B has just cause to take the land back.
That goal may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion will take place, but for B to invade and annex regions of A is nominally a disproportionate response, unless controversially that is the only method for securing guarantees of no future reprisals.
For B to invade and annex A and then to continue to invade neutral neighboring nations on the grounds that their territory would provide a useful defense against other threats and a putative imbalance of power is even more unsustainable.
Philosophically however they invoke a plethora of problems by either their independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent results — a properly declared war may involve improper intention or disproportionate ambitions.
But war is a complicated issue and the principles are nonetheless a useful starting point for ethical examination and they remain a guide for both statesmen and women and for those who judge political proceedings.
The rules of just conduct within war fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality. The principle of discrimination concerns who are legitimate targets in war, whilst the principle of proportionality concerns how much force is morally appropriate.
A third principle can be added to the traditional two, namely the principle of responsibility, which demands an examination of where responsibility lies in war.
One strong implication of the justice of warfare being a separate topic of analysis to the justice of war is that the theory thus permits the judging of acts within war to be dissociated from it cause.
This allows the theorist to claim that a nation fighting an unjust cause may still fight justly, or a nation fighting a just cause may be said to fight unjustly.
It is a useful division but one that does not necessarily sever all ties between the two great principles of warfare: the justice of a cause remains a powerful moral guide by which warfare is to be judged, for what does it matter, it can be asked, if a nation wages a war of aggression but does so cleanly?
In waging war it is considered unfair and unjust to attack indiscriminately since non-combatants or innocents are deemed to stand outside the field of war proper.
Immunity from war can be reasoned from the fact that their existence and activity is not part of the essence of war, which is the killing of combatants.
Since killing itself is highly problematic, the just war theorist has to proffer a reason why combatants become legitimate targets in the first place, and whether their status alters if they are fighting a just or unjust war.
Voluntarists may invoke the boxing ring analogy: punching another individual is not morally supportable in a civilized community, but those who voluntarily enter the boxing ring renounce their right not to be hit.
Such an argument would imply that it is right to attack unarmed soldiers or soldiers who have surrendered or who are enjoying the normality of civilian life, which just war theorists and historical conventions have traditionally rejected on the claim that when a soldier lays down his weapons or removes his uniform, he or she returns to civilian life and hence the status of the non-combatant even if that return is temporary.
Others, avoiding a rights analysis for it produces many problems on delineating the boundaries of rights and the bearers, may argue that those who join the army or who have even been pressed into conscription come to terms with being a target, and hence their own deaths.
However, since civilians can just as readily come to terms with their own deaths and it is not necessarily the case that a soldier has, their argument, although interesting, is not sufficient to defend the principle of discrimination and why soldiers alone should be targeted legitimately in war.
In turn, rights-based analyses may be more philosophically productive in giving soldiers and critics crucial guidelines, especially those analyses that focus on the renouncing of rights by combatants by virtue of their war status, which would leave nominally intact a sphere of immunity for civilians.
Yet what is the status of guerrilla fighters who use civilian camouflage in order to press their attacks or to hide? Similarly, soldiers on covert operations present intricate problems of identification and legitimization: is there a difference between the two?
Walzer, in his Just and Unjust Wars claims that the lack of identification does not give a government the right to kill indiscriminately—the onus is on the government to identify the combatants, and so, the implication goes, if there is any uncertainty involved then an attack must not be made.
Others have argued that the nature of modern warfare dissolves the possibility of discrimination: civilians are just as necessary causal conditions for the war machine as are combatants, therefore, they claim, there is no moral distinction in targeting an armed combatant and a civilian involved in arming or feeding the combatant.
The distinction is, however, not closed by the nature of modern economies, since a combatant still remains a very different entity from a non-combatant, if not for the simple reason that the former is presently armed and hence has renounced rights or is prepared to die, or is a threat , whilst the civilian is not.
On the other hand, it can be argued that being a civilian does not necessarily mean that one is not a threat and hence not a legitimate target. If Mr Smith is the only individual in the nation to possess the correct combination that will detonate a device that could kill thousands, then he becomes not only causally efficacious in the firing of a weapon of war, but also morally responsible; reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target.
His job effectively militarizes his status even though he does not bear arms. At a deeper level, one can consider the role that civilians play in supporting an unjust war: to what extent are they morally culpable, and if they are culpable in giving moral, financial, or economic support to some extent, does that mean they may become legitimate targets?
This invokes the issue of collective versus individual responsibility that is in itself a complex topic but one that the principle of discrimination tries to circumvent by presenting guidelines for soldiers that keep their activity within the realms of war and its effects rather than murder.
It would be wrong, on the principle of discrimination, to group the enemy into one targetable mass of people — some can not be responsible for a war or its procedures, notably children.
The second principle of just conduct is that any offensive action should remain strictly proportional to the objective desired.
This principle overlaps with the proportionality principle of just cause, but it is distinct enough to consider it in its own light.
Proportionality for jus In bello requires tempering the extent and violence of warfare to minimize destruction and casualties.
It is broadly utilitarian in that it seeks to minimize overall suffering, but it can also be understood from other moral perspectives, for instance, from harboring good will to all Kantian ethics , or acting virtuously Aristotelian ethics.
Whilst the consideration of discrimination focuses on who is a legitimate target of war, the principle of proportionality deals with what kind of force is morally permissible.
In fighting a just war in which only military targets are attacked, it is still possible to breach morality by employing disproportionate force against an enemy.
Whilst the earlier theoreticians, such as Thomas Aquinas, invoked the Christian concepts of charity and mercy, modern theorists may invoke either consequentialist or intrinsicist prescriptions, both of which remain problematic as the foregoing discussions have noted.
However, it does not seem morally reasonable to completely gun down a barely armed albeit belligerent tribe. At the battle of Omdurman in in the Sudan, six machine gunners killed thousands of dervishes—the gunners may have been in the right to defend themselves, but the principle of proportionality implies that a battle end before it becomes a massacre.
What if a war and all of its suffering could be avoided by highly selective killing? Could just war theory endorse assassination for instance? The CIA manual on assassination , cf.
Belfield , sought to distinguish between murder and assassination, the latter being justifiable according to the higher purposes sought.
This is analogous to just war theorists seeking to put mass killing on a higher moral ground than pure massacre and slaughter and is fraught with the same problems raised in this article and in the just war literature.
On grounds of discrimination, assassination would be justifiable if the target were legitimate and not, say, the wife or children of a legitimate target.
On grounds of proportionality, the policy would also be acceptable, for if one man or woman a legitimate target by virtue of his or her aggression should die to avoid further bloodshed or to secure a quicker victory, then surely assassination is covered by the just war theory?
The founder of the Hashshashin society c. Once initiated, assassination tends to become the norm of political affairs — indeed, civil politics would thus crumble into fearful and barbaric plots and conspiracies as did Rome in its last centuries in a race to gain power and mastery over others rather than to forge justifiable sovereignty.
Accordingly, they are complemented by other considerations that are not always explicitly taken up in the traditional exposition of jus In bello , this is especially true in the case of the issue of responsibility.
Jus in bello requires that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions. This ties in their actions to morality generally.
Readily it can be accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is part of the nature of warfare for which soldiers ought to be prepared and trained, but when soldiers turn their weapons against non-combatants, or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable, then they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of murder.
The principle of responsibility re-asserts the burden of abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war to remind them that one day they will once more take up civilian status and should be prepared to do so conscientiously, free of any guilt from war crimes.
Responsibility for acts of war relate back to the tenets of jus ad bellum as well as jus in bello , for the justification of going to war involves responsibility as well as the acts ordered and committed in war.
The aftermath of war involves the relinquishing of armed conflict as a means of resolving disputes and the donning of more civil modes of conduct but it also raises questions concerning the nature of the post bellum justice.
Following the cessation of a war, three possibilities emerge: either the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a ceasefire.
Principles of justice may then be applied to each situation. It has often been remarked that justice, like history, is written by the victors.
A defeated army and indeed the civilian body from which the army stems should thus be prepared to subject itself to the imposition of rules and forms of punishments, humiliation, and even retributions that it would not otherwise agree to.
The lives, values, and resources that have been fought for must now be handed over to the conquerors. The just war theorist is keen to remind warriors and politicians alike that the principles of justice following war should be universalizable and morally ordered and that victory should not provide a license for imposing unduly harsh or punitive measures or that state or commercial interests should not dictate the form of the new peace.
In post-war Iraq date , the rehabilitation programs have met with mixed success and have often been criticized for favoring some ethnic groups over others, i.
Criticism may stem from either intrinsicist reasons that the defeated should still be viewed as a people deserving moral respect and their traditions held as sacrosanct or consequentialist reasons that punitive impositions are likely to produce a backlash ; but again it is worth reminding that just war theory tends to merge the two to avoid awkward implications derived from either position singly.
At this point, the attraction for jus post bellum thinkers is to return to the initial justice of the war. Consider a war of self-defense: this is considered by most, except absolute pacifists, to be the most justifiable of all wars.
If the people are defeated but their cause remains just, should they then continue the fight to rid their country of all the vestiges of occupation?
What if fighting is impossible? A realist, however, may ask how a people are to regain their freedom if they do not raise arms against their sea of troubles?
Others may counsel civil disobedience and other forms of intransigence to signal displeasure. The aggressor, one who initiates war, puts the individual or the community into a state of war, he argues, and so the defender has an absolute prerogative to use whatever force necessary to secure freedom and peace: accordingly, in victory, the victors may enslave or kill the aggressors.
Indeed, King Alfred the Great of Wessex c. Here we enter the debates regarding punishment: does punishing a violator make any sense except to exact either retribution, revenge, or to promote a deterrence?
Can the victors be sure of their claim to punish the aggressors and what good could possibly flow from bringing more violence or enslavement to the world?
In asserting the need to find universalisable principles, the just war theorist is usually keen to insist that any war crimes trials are held in neutral states and presided over by neutral parties, rather than the victors whose partiality in proceedings must be presumed: after all, in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, no allied generals or politicians were held accountable for the atrocities created by bombing civilian centers in Germany and Japan and the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The end game and hence the jus post bellum certainly merit attention before the battles are lost or won: what should be the ruling affairs once the peace is proclaimed?
Is it right that an army should demand unconditional surrender, for instance, when such a policy may entail a protracted war for no incentive is given to the other side to surrender; on the other hand, unconditional surrender implies a derogatory view of the enemy as one not to be respected either in or after war.
Yet if an unconditional surrender policy does suitably raise the stakes of fighting war it may act as a sufficient deterrent against possible aggressors or act as a useful diplomatic tool to bring a worried enemy back to peaceful overtures.
Similarly, is it right that an army should demand reparations in advance rather than leave them undisclosed and thereby risk the uncertainty of punishment creating a backlash from the defeated, who may not wish to be so subjected?
Of course, if promises of an amnesty or fair treatment of prisoners is reneged on by the victor, then all trust for future arrangements is lost and the consequences imply embedding hatreds and mistrust for generations.
Assume that victory is given, that the army has defeated its enemy on the battlefield so attention turns to the nature of the post bellum justice of dealing with the defeated regardless of its intentions beforehand.
Consider the demands for reparations. A defeated aggressor may just be asked to pay for the damage incurred by the war as justice demands of criminals that they pay for their crimes.
But to what extent should the reparations extend? Should a war be indecisive though, the character of the peace would presumably be formed by the character of the ceasefire — namely, the cessation of fighting would imply a mere hiatus in which the belligerents regain the time and resources to stock their defenses and prepare for further fighting.
As such, a ceasefire would be merely a respite for the military to regain its strengths. However, just war theory also acts to remind contenders that war is a last resort and that its essential aim is always peace, so if peace is forthcoming in any guise, it is morally critical for all parties to seek a return to a permanent peace rather than a momentary lapse of war.
This article has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails. The theory bridges theoretical and applied ethics, since it demands an adherence, or at least a consideration of meta-ethical conditions and models, as well as prompting concern for the practicalities of war.
A few of those practicalities have been mentioned here. Other areas of interest are: hostages, innocent threats, international blockades, sieges, the use of weapons of mass destruction or of anti-personnel weapons for example, land mines , and the morality and practicalities of interventionism.
Alexander Moseley Email: alexandermoseley icloud. Just War Theory Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. Introduction Historically, the just war tradition—a set of mutually agreed rules of combat—may be said to commonly evolve between two culturally similar enemies.
The Jus Ad Bellum Convention The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be: having just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used.
The Principles Of Jus In Bello The rules of just conduct within war fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality.
Jus post bellum Following the cessation of a war, three possibilities emerge: either the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a ceasefire.
Conclusion This article has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails.
References and Further Reading Anscombe, Elizabeth. In Ethics, Religion, and Politics. University of Minnesota Press. Aquinas, St Thomas.
Politics and Ethics. Augustine, St. City of God. Belfield, Richard Assassination: The Killers and their Paymasters Revealed. Magpie Books.
Burke, Edmund Reflections on the Revolution in France. Dockrill, Michael and Barrie Paskins The Ethics of War.
Hobbes, Thomas Jokic Alexsander, and Anthony Ellis eds. Locke, John Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge University Press.
Machiavelli, Nicolo The Prince. Minear, Richard Moseley, Alexander and Richard Norman, eds. Moseley, Alexander Contents 1 Performances 2 Sheet Music 2.